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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we investigate empirically the relationship between inflation and inflation uncertainty in 
twelve EMU countries. We estimate a time-varying parameter model with a GARCH specification for 
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and steady-state uncertainty. We then introduce a dummy variable to model the policy regime shift 
which occurred in 1999 with the introduction of the Euro, and its effects on the links between inflation 
and inflation uncertainty. We find that steady-state inflation has generally remained stable (with the 
important exception of Germany, where the trend has become positive), steady-state inflation 
uncertainty and inflation persistence have both increased, and the relationship between inflation and 
inflation uncertainty has broken down in many countries. These findings cast doubt on the optimistic 
view taken by the ECB concerning its success in controlling inflation, and suggest the need for 
improvements in its analytical framework. 
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1. Introduction 
The introduction of the euro and of a common monetary policy in 1999 
undoubtedly represented a major policy regime shift for the member countries of the 
European Monetary Union (EMU). This could have affected both inflation 
expectations and inflation uncertainty, as, at least initially, agents might not have 
been certain of the objective function and the policy preferences of the European 
Central Bank (ECB), and of how they might compare to those of the national central 
banks previously in charge of monetary policy (for instance, the ECB might have 
been perceived as less credible than the Bundesbank, which had an established anti-
inflation reputation). Uncertainty about the policy preferences of the new monetary 
authorities might also result in higher inflation forecast errors. According to the 
Maastricht Treaty, although the primary objective of the ECB is price stability 
(which the ECB has interpreted as an annual Euro area inflation rate below, but close 
to, 2% in the medium run), it should also be concerned about output and employment 
(albeit without prejudicing its main objective). The monetary policy framework 
adopted by the ECB to fulfil these tasks is based on two analytical perspectives or 
two “pillars”, namely economic analysis and monetary analysis1, and the ECB has 
repeatedly stated that achieving price stability is the most effective way to contribute 
to output and employment growth (see, e.g. Monetary Policy Strategy, 1999), but 
nevertheless higher uncertainty might have characterised the new economic 
environment. 
Analysing survey data, Heinemann and Ullrich (2004) do not find significant 
differences in the inflationary credibility of the ECB compared to the Bundesbank, 
and hence no permanent change in inflation expectations. However, their analysis 
suggests that the higher uncertainty characterising the period leading up to EMU led 
to a temporary change in expectation formation, with agents relying more heavily on 
backward-looking expectations, before reverting to the normal mechanisms once the 
ECB had established its inflation credibility. 
                                                          
1 Economic analysis aims at assessing the short- to medium-term determinants of price developments 
focusing on real activity and financial conditions in the economy. Monetary analysis focuses on a 
longer-term horizon taking into account the long-run relationship between money and prices. A 
reference value of 4.5% for the growth rate of broad money (M3) that is compatible with price 
stability has been calculated using the quantity theory equation. The ECB has stated, though, that 
“monetary policy does not react mechanically to deviations of M3 growth from the reference value” 
(see The Monetary Policy of the ECB, 2004). As Rudebusch and Svensson (1999, p.1) point out, the 
ECB strategy “appears to be a combination of a weak type of monetary targeting and an implicit form 
of inflation targeting”.  
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As for inflation uncertainty, in a recent review of the performance of the ECB 
in the first few years of the new regime, its President, Jean-Claude Trichet, has 
expressed the view that “… the ECB has, despite substantial adverse price shocks, 
successfully kept inflation and inflation expectations at low levels by historical 
standards. The single monetary policy and its clear focus on the maintenance of price 
stability have helped to anchor inflation expectations in the euro area over the 
medium and the long term. This has facilitated a reduction of inflation uncertainty 
and the associated risk premia” (see Trichet, 2004). 
In this paper, we analyse empirically how the new policy regime with the 
ECB setting a common interest rate for the EMU countries has in fact affected 
inflation uncertainty and, consequently, inflation itself in the Euro area adopting an 
appropriate econometric framework. Specifically, we use a time-varying model with 
a GARCH specification for the conditional volatility of inflation, as in Evans (1991), 
and obtain estimates for twelve EMU countries, over the period 1973-2004, using 
monthly data. The adopted framework enables us to distinguish between different 
types of inflation uncertainty which can affect the inflation process. Our aim is to 
establish whether the ECB has been as successful as claimed by its President, Mr. 
Trichet, in creating a less inflationary environment. For this purpose, we focus on the 
policy regime shift which occurred in 1999, which is modelled by introducing in the 
estimated models a step dummy corresponding to the adoption of the Euro. In 
particular, we investigate four issues, namely whether and how the introduction of 
the Euro has affected: a) steady-state inflation; b) steady-state inflation uncertainty; 
c) inflation persistence; d) the relationship between inflation and inflation 
uncertainty.  
The layout of the paper is the following. Section 2 reviews the relevant 
literature. Section 3 outlines the empirical framework. Section 4 presents the 
empirical results. Section 5 interprets them with a view to assessing the validity of 
Mr Trichet’s statement on the ECB’s successful experience in controlling inflation. 
Section 6 summarises the main findings and discusses their policy implications. 
 
2. A Brief Literature Review 
The relationship between inflation and inflation uncertainty has received 
increased attention in recent years. Friedman (1977) first argued that higher average 
inflation would result in more inflation uncertainty. This idea was developed by Ball 
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(1992): in his model, in the presence of two types of policymakers with different 
preferences, who stochastically alternate in power, higher inflation generates higher 
inflation uncertainty, as agents do not know when monetary authorities with a 
tougher stance on inflation will replace the current ones. Causality in the opposite 
direction, namely from inflation uncertainty to inflation, is instead a property of 
models based on the Barro-Gordon setup, such as the one due to Cukierman and 
Meltzer (1986), in which there is an incentive for policymakers to create inflation 
surprises to raise output growth. 2
A number of empirical studies have investigated this relationship, normally 
adopting an econometric framework of the GARCH type (see Engle, 1982), and 
providing mixed evidence (see Davis and Kanago, 2000 for a survey). For instance, 
Grier and Perry (1998) estimate GARCH models to generate a measure of inflation 
uncertainty, and then carry out Granger causality tests. Using data for the G7 
countries, they find strong evidence of causality running from inflation uncertainty to 
inflation, but less empirical support for causality in the opposite direction (see also 
Baillie et al, 1996). Various studies focus on the US, again with mixed results. 
Brunner and Hess (1993), and Grier and Perry (1998, 2000), inter alia, find evidence 
of a Friedman effect, with Baillie et al (1996) reporting the opposite. More recently, 
the impact of inflation targeting on this relationship has been analysed. Kontonikas 
(2004) reports that the adoption of an explicit target in the UK has resulted in lower 
inflation persistence and long-run uncertainty. Fountas et al (2004) argue that in the 
context of EMU the linkages between inflation, inflation uncertainty and output 
growth have even more important implications for monetary policy, since price 
stability becomes an even more crucial policy objective for the ECB if inflation is 
found to affect inflation uncertainty. Further, asymmetries in the effects of inflation 
uncertainty on output across member countries could make a common monetary 
policy a less effective stabilisation tool. In fact their empirical analysis, based on 
EGARCH models, provides evidence supporting the Friedman hypothesis and the 
presence of asymmetric real effects. However, their sample period is 1960-1999, and 
hence does not include the new monetary policy setting resulting from the 
introduction of the euro, whose effects on inflation we wish to examine. Further, 
their analysis does not distinguish between different types of inflation uncertainty, 
whilst the approach taken in the present study, as explained below, enables us to 
                                                          
2 Note that the effect of inflation on its uncertainty can also be negative (see Fountas and Karanasos, 
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measure separately the impact of short-run (structural and impulse) and long-run 
uncertainty. 3
 
3. Econometric Framework 
According to Pagan (1984), simultaneous conditional mean and variance 
estimation as in a GARCH-in-mean (GARCH-M) model is more efficient than a 
two-step approach where the conditional variance is estimated first using a GARCH 
specification, and then included in the conditional mean equation to carry out 
causality tests. For this reason, a GARCH-M model is estimated by Kontonikas 
(2004). However, as pointed out by Grier and Perry (1998) and Fountas et al (2004), 
this approach has the drawback that it does not allow the testing of possible lagged 
effects of inflation uncertainty on inflation, which might exist at the monthly or 
quarterly frequency; for this reason, these authors use two-step procedures instead, as 
we also do (see below).4
It should be noted as well that conventional GARCH models impose a 
symmetry restriction on the conditional variance. As highlighted by Brunner and 
Hess (1993), this is inconsistent with the Friedman hypothesis, which implies that 
new information leading to a downward revision of inflation expectations should also 
lower inflation uncertainty. Models allowing for an asymmetric impact of news on 
inflation uncertainty include the EGARCH model of Nelson (1991), which, in 
contrast to standard GARCH specifications, does not impose non-negativity 
constraints on the parameter space (this approach is taken by Fountas et al, 2004); the 
Threshold GARCH (TGARCH) model of Zakoian (1994) and Glosten et al (1993), 
and the component GARCH (CGARCH) model of Engle and Lee (1993) (both these 
models are estimated by Grier and Perry, 1998, and Kontonikas, 2004). The 
CGARCH model has the additional advantage of decomposing inflation uncertainty 
into a short-run and a long-run component by permitting transitory deviations of the 
conditional volatility around a time-varying trend.  
 All the methods discussed above have the drawback that they do not take into 
account the fact that uncertainty about the long- and short-term prospects for 
inflation might differ significantly and affect inflation expectations in different ways. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
2006, for a review of relevant studies). 
3 Another strand of the literature analyses the relationship between inflation and its uncertainty using 
long-memory models (see Conrad and Karanasos, 2006). 
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As emphasised by Evans (1991), agents’ temporal decisions are more likely to be 
affected by the conditional variance of short-run movements in inflation, whilst 
intertemporal decisions might be based mainly on changes in the conditional 
variance of long-term inflation. Moreover, one should distinguish between 
“structural uncertainty” (associated with the randomness in the time-varying 
parameters, and representing the propagation mechanism), which might originate, for 
instance, from unanticipated monetary policy changes, and “impulse uncertainty” 
(associated with the shocks hitting the conditional variance, which are propagated 
through the parameters of the inflation process), reflecting, for example, changes in 
the variance of structural disturbances such as price shocks (see Berument et al, 
2005).  
The econometric framework suggested by Evans (1991), and also adopted by 
Berument et al (2005) in their analysis of the linkages between inflation uncertainty 
and interest rates, has the advantage over alternative approaches of yielding estimates 
of the various types of uncertainty discussed above. Following these authors, in the 
present study we also utilise a GARCH model with time-varying parameters, which 
are estimated using Kalman filtering. More specifically, inflation is specified as a    
k-th order autoregressive process, AR(k), with time-varying parameters, the residuals 
of this equation following a GARCH(p,q) process. 5 The model is the following: 
 
1 1t e tπ + = +t t+1X β + k where        and   1 (0, )t te N h+   [1,  ,  ...,  ]t tπ π −=tX   (1) 
2
1 1
q p
t i t i
i j
h h a e hλ j t j− −
= =
= + +∑ ∑         (2) 
= +t+1 t t+1β β V  where          (3) ( , )Nt+1V 0  Q
                                                                                                                                                                    
 
4 Fountas et al (2004) also report the estimation results of an EGARCH-M model, which confirm the 
fact that a simultaneous approach does not detect the causal effect of inflation uncertainty on inflation. 
5 Evans and Wachtel (1993) stress that the assumption of fixed parameters in the inflation process 
overestimates the degree to which agents can forecast inflation, and consequently underestimates 
inflation uncertainty. They decompose the sources of inflation uncertainty into two components: 
“regime uncertainty component” and “certainty equivalence component”. The second component 
ignores uncertainty about future inflation regimes and reflects only the variance of future shocks to the 
inflation process. The first component reflects the agents’ uncertainty about the characteristics of the 
current policy regime or even future regimes, if there is a possibility that the regime will change.  
Thus, cross-counties differences in the conduct of monetary policy may account for the differences in 
the average levels of uncertainty. This decomposition allows inflation uncertainty to change over time 
as agents keep updating their information on the current regime and their expectations about the future 
regime.  See also the comment by Brunner (1993). 
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where πt+1 denotes the rate of inflation between t and t+1; Xt is a vector of 
explanatory variables known at time t; et+1 describes the shocks to the inflation 
process that cannot be forecast with information known at time t; et+1 is assumed to 
be normally distributed with a time-varying conditional variance ht. The conditional 
variance is specified as a GARCH(p,q) process, that is, as a linear function of past 
squared forecast errors, e2t-i, and past variances, ht-j. Further, 
 denotes the time-varying parameter vector, and V'0, 1 1, 1 , 1[ , ,..., ]t t k tβ β β+ + +=t+1β t+1 is a 
vector of shocks to βt+1, assumed to be normally distributed with a homoscedastic 
covariance matrix Q. The updating equations for the Kalman filter are: 
 
1t tE 1tπ ε+ = +t t+1X β +          (4) 
'
tH = t tt+1 tX Ω X th+          (5) 
'
1 2 1 1[t t tE E H 1] tε+ = +t+ t+ tt+1 tβ β Ω X − +        (6) 
'
12 1 [ ]tH −+ = − +t tt+ t t+1 t t+1 tΩ I Ω X X Ω Q       (7) 
 
where t+1 tΩ  is the conditional covariance matrix of  given the information set at 
time t, representing uncertainty about the structure of the inflation process.  
t+1β
As Eq. (5) indicates, the conditional variance of inflation (short-run 
uncertainty), Ht, can be decomposed into: (i) the uncertainty due to randomness in 
the inflation shocks et+1, measured by their conditional volatility ht (impulse 
uncertainty); (ii) the uncertainty due to unanticipated changes in the structure of 
inflation Vt+1, measured by the conditional variance of , which is t t+1X β
'
tS=t tt+1 tX Ω X  (structural uncertainty). The standard GARCH model can be 
obtained as a special case of our model if there is no uncertainty about , so that t+1β
=t+1 tΩ 0 . In this case, the conditional variance of inflation depends solely on 
impulse uncertainty6. Eqs. (6) and (7) capture the updating of the conditional 
distribution of over time in response to new information about realised inflation. 
As indicated by Eq. (6), inflation innovations, defined as ε
t+1β
t+1  in Eq. (4), are used to 
update the estimates of . These estimates are then used to forecast future 
inflation.  
t+1β
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If there are no inflation shocks and parameter shocks, so that 
1 ...t t t kπ π π+ = = = −  for all t, we can calculate the steady-state rate of inflation, * 1tπ + , 
as: 
 
1
*
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−
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The conditional variance of steady-state inflation is then given by: 
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 Having computed short-run and steady-state uncertainty measures for each 
country, we then proceed, in the second part of our empirical investigation, to 
analyse the links between the various types of inflation uncertainty and the level of 
inflation, as well as to examine the impact of the Euro. Specifically, we regress 
month-to-month changes in the two uncertainty measures against changes in past 
inflation7. Moreover, we include a dummy variable to allow for possible intercept 
and slope changes in the underlying relationship between inflation uncertainty and 
past inflation reflecting the introduction of the Euro. The estimated model is the 
following: 
 
1 0 1 1 2 3 1( )t t t tunc D Dγ γ γ γ π+ + +∆ = + + + ∆ +θ +
                                                                                                                                                                    
                      (11) 
 
6 As Evans (1991) argues, if there is uncertainty about βt+1, ht will tend to understate the true 
conditional variance since St > 0.  
7 As Evans (1991, p. 180) notes, “the regressions use the month-to-month changes in the variances 
and inflation because inflation has a unit root and all three variances are complicated functions of past 
inflation”. 
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where unct+1 represents in turn steady-state uncertainty (i.e. ) and short-run 
uncertainty (i.e., ), and D
2 *
1(t tσ π + )
t
tH t+1 is a dummy variable equal to zero during the pre-
Euro period and one during the Euro period. 8
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
Inflation is measured as the first difference of the logarithm of the seasonally 
adjusted consumer price index (CPI), 1 1100*(ln ln )t tCPI CPIπ + += − , using monthly 
data for twelve EMU countries (Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, 
Ireland, Finland, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Austria) over the period 1973-
2004. Six years of the Euro period are included in our sample9, allowing us to study 
the effects of the 1999 policy regime shift on inflation uncertainty over a reasonably 
long horizon. The data are obtained from OECD's Main Economic Indicators: 
Historical Statistics.  
Table 1 reports the results from ADF (see Dickey and Fuller, 1979, 1981) and 
KPSS (see Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shin, 1992) unit root tests with an 
intercept and a deterministic linear trend. Overall, the results suggest that inflation in 
our sample countries has a unit root, which can justify our choice of a random walk 
model for the time-varying parameters of the inflation process (see Evans, 1991). In 
a recent paper, Rapach and Weber (2004) also find that inflation is non-stationary 
using a sample of OECD countries and a variety of unit root testing procedures. 
 
  [Table 1 about here] 
 
  [Figure 1 about here] 
  
We have estimated a time-varying GARCH model for inflation with Kalman 
filtering, as described in section 3. Figures 1-3 are based on the estimation results.10 
Figure 1 plots actual inflation and steady-state inflation in the EMU countries over 
the period 1980.01-2004.11. In the early years of the new monetary regime the Euro 
area was affected by a variety of price shocks such as the tripling of oil prices 
                                                          
8 In the case of Finland, where inflation targeting was adopted over the period 1993-1998, we also 
included intercept and level dummies for this policy change, but these turned out not to be statistically 
significant. 
9 As Greece adopted the Euro only in January 2001, the corresponding sub-sample is four years. 
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between early 1999 and mid-2000, the depreciation of the common currency over 
this period, and finally, in 2001, significant increases in food prices, due to a series of 
livestock epidemics.  This is evident across the EMU countries in the plots of actual 
inflation. Average monthly inflation rates vary considerably in the EMU area, 
ranging from 0.2% in Germany to 1% in Greece. Similarly to the former country, 
mean monthly inflation rates in the Benelux countries (Belgium, Netherlands, 
Luxembourg) and Austria were low: 0.26%, 0.21%, 0.26% and 0.23%, respectively. 
Steady-state inflation follows similar patterns, with Greece exhibiting the worst 
performance, with an annualised steady-state inflation rate of 12%, while in 
Germany the corresponding value was 2.5%. Busetti et al (2006) also present 
evidence of diverging behaviour in the inflation rate of the EMU countries since 
1999. Such inflation differentials are often found even within monetary unions, 
where many economic differences may survive. The ECB itself admits that 
“monetary policy can only influence the price level of the Euro area as a whole and 
cannot affect inflation differentials across regions” (see The Monetary Policy of the 
ECB, 2004). Nevertheless, from the viewpoint of monetary policy effectiveness in 
stimulating economic growth, inflation rates in EMU countries should converge in 
order for changes in the Euro-wide nominal interest rate to be translated into similar 
real interest rate changes across member countries.  
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
 Figure 2 plots short-run uncertainty and steady-state uncertainty. The former 
appears to have decreased over time along with average inflation in Portugal and 
Greece, while in France it has increased. In Italy, Spain, Ireland and Finland one can 
identify large increases in short-run uncertainty in the first part of the 1980s followed 
by a relatively stable period. In Germany a large temporary increase in short-run 
uncertainty can be noticed around the time of the re-unification in the early 1990s. 
Short-run uncertainty in the Netherlands and Austria is relatively stable, apart from 
occasional temporary shocks. The same applies to Luxembourg, with the exception 
of a large temporary jump in 1999. It should be pointed out that some short-term 
volatility in inflation is inevitable given the fact that monetary policy can only affect 
                                                                                                                                                                    
10 The estimated parameters for each country are not presented to save space, but are available from 
the authors upon request. 
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prices with long and uncertain lags - hence the focus of the ECB on medium-term 
price stabilisation.  
Regarding the uncertainty associated with long-run inflation, it appears again 
that a uniform experience did not occur, since steady-state uncertainty seems to 
increase towards the end of the sample period in Germany, Italy, Spain, Portugal, 
Luxembourg and Austria, while in France, Ireland, Finland and Belgium it declines 
over time. Only in the Greek case does the uncertainty associated with steady-state 
inflation increase steadily throughout the sample period.11 Clearly, the presence of 
such significant differentials across the countries of the Euro area in terms of long-
run (as opposed to short-run) uncertainty has important policy implications, given the 
focus of the ECB on maintaining price stability in the Euro area over longer periods 
of time.  
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
 Figure 3 plots inflation persistence (the sum of the estimated autoregressive 
coefficients in the inflation specification) and the trend component of inflation (the 
estimated constant in the inflation process). The former increases over time in 
Germany, Italy, Spain and Austria. This is in line with previous work by Angeloni et 
al (2005) finding that inflation persistence in the Euro area did not decline after the 
introduction of the Euro. Batini (2002) also shows that inflation in the Euro area is 
inertial using the autocorrelation function of inflation and the lag in the inflation 
response to monetary policy shocks from VAR’s to measure inflation persistence. 
Our results show that in some cases (Finland, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg) 
inflation persistence becomes negative. This can be interpreted in terms of an error-
correction mechanism in inflation: as inflation grows large, the central bank adopts 
tougher anti-inflationary policies. Trend inflation decreases over time in the majority 
of the sample countries, reflecting the general move towards lower inflation after the 
highly inflationary 1970s.  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
                                                          
11 One possible explanation is the failure on the part of the Greek authorities to implement overdue 
structural changes to the economy, resorting instead to “creative” accounting practises to hide the true 
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 Table 2 reports robust estimates of the parameters of Eq. (11) (see Newey and 
West, 1994).  Consistently with the hypothesis put forward by Friedman (1977) and 
formalised by Ball (1992), the coefficient of past inflation, γ2, is positive and 
significant in six out of our twelve sample countries in the steady-state uncertainty 
regressions, i.e. in the case of France, Italy, Portugal, Belgium, Luxembourg and 
Austria. When the change in short-run uncertainty is employed as a dependent 
variable, γ2 is significantly positive in five instances, i.e. in Germany, France, 
Portugal, Greece and Ireland12. This suggests that, by lowering average inflation, 
monetary authorities can reduce the negative consequences of inflation uncertainty.  
As for the impact of the Euro and common monetary policy on inflation 
uncertainty, we find that the coefficient of the intercept dummy, γ1, is positive and 
statistically significant for Italy and Austria in the steady-state regressions, indicating 
that steady-state uncertainty has increased in the Euro period in these countries. The 
coefficient of the slope dummy, γ3, is negative and statistically significant in eight 
countries (Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Greece, Belgium, Luxembourg, Austria) in 
the steady-state regressions and in three countries (Germany, Greece, Ireland) in the 
short-run regressions. This indicates an important change in the underlying 
relationship between inflation and uncertainty occurring in these countries as a result 
of the introduction of the Euro, since a negative and significant γ3 implies that in the 
Euro period further reductions in average inflation increase, rather than reduce, 
uncertainty. The Wald F-statistic for the null hypothesis: γ2 +γ3 = 0, indicates that 
after the introduction of the Euro the relationship between past inflation and current 
short-run uncertainty breaks down in the case of Germany, Greece, and Ireland, 
while in the steady-state regressions the null hypothesis is not rejected in the case of 
Luxembourg and Austria. Thus, in many instances, the Friedman-Ball link that calls 
for policies aiming at low inflation in order to reduce the corresponding uncertainty 
appears not to exist in the Euro period. This finding may reflect the fact that inflation 
has been relatively low in all advanced economies since the 1990s, irrespective of 
whether or not an explicit inflation target was in place. Therefore, there might not be 
room for further reductions in average inflation, with the associated risk of 
generating deflationary pressures, and policies aimed at achieving even lower 
inflation may paradoxically result into higher uncertainty.  
                                                                                                                                                                    
extent of their fiscal problems (see the report by the Commission of the European Communities, 
2004).   
12 This is in line with previous evidence for the UK (see Kontonikas, 2004). 
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 5.  Interpreting the Evidence 
To what extent are the empirical results discussed above consistent with Mr. 
Trichet’s opinion that the ECB has successfully brought inflation under control? To 
answer this question, in this section we evaluate the validity of his statement using 
the four criteria mentioned in the introduction, i.e. the effects of the Euro on: a) 
steady-state inflation; b) steady-state inflation uncertainty; c) inflation persistence; d) 
the relationship between inflation and inflation uncertainty.  
With regard to steady-state inflation, our results generally support Mr. 
Trichet’s claim, as this variable appears to have remained stable; however, Germany, 
where the downward trend observed from 1992 appears to have been replaced by a 
positive one from the time of the introduction of the Euro, represents and important 
exception, this country having a special weight for the EMU project as a whole. This 
increase in German steady-state inflation may be due to the fact that ECB's monetary 
policy has in general been rather loose since 1990, and/or it might reflect the fact that 
Germany has failed to put her public finances right. Of course, one might argue that 
Germany's weak internal demand in recent years has resulted in a reduction in actual 
inflation, and it has been the cause, rather than the effect, of the ECB's loose 
monetary policy. This may be true, but it is not inconsistent with our results. Our 
analysis concerns steady-state inflation, i.e. inflation adjusted for the effects of the 
business cycle. An increase in German steady-state inflation is not inconsistent with 
low actual inflation in Germany. The latter (actual inflation) has two components, the 
steady-state and the business-cycle component. What our results imply is that 
Germany actual (total) inflation has stayed constant - this is entirely consistent with a 
state of affairs where one component (steady-state inflation) increases (due, for 
example, to long-run public finance difficulties), while the other component 
(business-cycle inflation) declines due to weak demand conditions.  Hence in the 
case of Germany the optimism of Mr. Trichet may be overlooking some very 
important underlying problems.  
As for the other EMU countries, although the evidence is consistent with Mr. 
Trichet's assessment, it is also true, as stressed above, that inflation in other non-
EMU industrialised countries has remained stable at low levels over the last few 
years. As also noticed before, it is worth noting that there exist substantial 
differences in the level of steady-state (and actual) inflation among EMU countries 
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(probably reflecting different degrees competition in the goods', capital and labour 
markets), which is a significant problem for the ECB and EMU in general. Although 
it is not the responsibility of monetary authorities policy to eliminate these 
differences, they undoubtedly exist and represent a significant challenge, whose 
seriousness is not duly emphasised in Mr. Trichet's comments. 
Moving on to inflation uncertainty, our finding of higher steady-state 
inflation uncertainty in many EMU countries casts serious doubt on the validity of 
Trichet's view, as increased uncertainty is clearly not beneficial to an economy's 
long-term prospects. It is not entirely clear why inflation uncertainty has increased. 
One possibility is that this reflects the uncertainty surrounding the general future 
economic prospects of the Eurozone owing to a sustained low-growth period and/or 
lack of transparency of the monetary policy framework adopted by the ECB (the dual 
strategy of simultaneous monetary and inflation targets may confuse agents); 
alternatively, it may reflect a lack of transparency with regard to the policy 
preferences of the ECB, in the presence of different economic requirements on the 
part of the individual member states. 
Concerning inflation persistence, the evidence again seems to contradict the 
optimism of Mr. Trichet. In particular, our empirical analysis can be interpreted as 
suggesting that, following the introduction of the Euro, individual countries have lost 
the flexibility independent monetary policy provided to them to reduce inflation 
quickly; consequently, inflation persistence has increased as a result of the lack of 
ability of individual countries to respond flexibly to their particular inflation 
dynamics. In brief, our finding of higher inflation persistence may be related to the 
basic argument against the Euro, i.e. that participating countries lose a useful policy 
tool (monetary policy) to manage their economies in the short- and medium-run.  
Finally, the breakdown of the relationship between inflation and inflation 
uncertainty, which we find, is also important as it indicates that an important 
monetary policy mechanism, i.e. the effect that more stable 
inflation expectations has on actual inflation, may have been invalidated. This, 
together with the heterogeneity of our results (i.e. the fact that for some 
countries the relationship has broken down, for others it has not; for some it 
has broken down for actual inflation, for others for steady-state inflation), is 
yet another confirmation of the difficulties faced by the ECB in  
adopting a common monetary policy for a number of quite different individual 
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countries, with different and perhaps divergent economic requirements.  Why this 
relationship has broken down is also a moot point.  
 
 
6. Conclusions  
In this paper, we have investigated empirically the relationship between 
inflation and inflation uncertainty in twelve EMU countries. Following Evans (1991) 
and Berument et al (2005), we have adopted a time-varying GARCH specification to 
model the conditional volatility of inflation in order to be able to distinguish between 
short-run (structural and impulse) and steady-state uncertainty. We have also 
analysed the impact on the links between inflation and inflation uncertainty of the 
policy regime shift which occurred in 1999, when the Euro was introduced and the 
ECB was given the task of setting a common monetary policy for all EMU countries. 
Our empirical findings can be summarised as follows. The inflation 
performance of the EMU member states has been very different over the whole 
period starting at the beginning of the 1980s, in terms of both actual and steady-state 
inflation. Similarly, no consistent pattern can be found for the degree of persistence 
of inflation. By contrast, as one would expect given the less inflationary environment 
prevailing after the inflation hike of the 1970s, trend inflation has generally become 
much lower. Concerning short-run and steady-state uncertainty, again the EMU 
countries appear to have had rather different experiences, with no clear picture 
emerging. Most interestingly and perhaps controversially, it appears that in many 
cases the introduction of the Euro has not been beneficial from the viewpoint of 
inflation uncertainty. In Austria and Italy, for example, we find a step increase in 
steady-state uncertainty following the adoption of the Euro. Moreover, in these and 
other six countries, i.e. Germany, Greece, France, Spain, Belgium and Luxembourg, 
it would seem that the pursuit of anti-inflationary policies by the ECB is 
counterproductive, in the sense that lower inflation might lead to higher steady-state 
uncertainty. The same applies to short-run uncertainty in the case of Germany, 
Greece and Ireland, where the Friedman-Ball link between inflation and inflation 
uncertainty is not found in the Euro period.  
On the whole, one could conclude that the monetary policy of the ECB has 
not been an unqualified success as suggested by its President, Mr. Trichet. To answer 
the four questions posed at the beginning, we find that steady-state inflation has 
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generally remained stable (with the important exception of Germany, where the trend 
has become positive), steady-state inflation uncertainty and inflation persistence have 
both increased, and the relationship between inflation and inflation uncertainty has 
broken down in many countries. This clearly suggests that the glowing assessment of 
the ECB’s inflation performance made by Mr. Trichet requires some rethinking. 
Although it is true that inflation has been relatively low in the EMU countries 
under the new regime, this also applies to all other OECD economies over the same 
period, and cannot obviously be attributed to the policy actions of the ECB. The case 
of Germany, a key EMU country, where steady-state inflation appears to have 
increased, obviously calls for special attention. Moreover, cross-country economic 
differences clearly still pose a stiff challenge to a common monetary policy. The 
higher steady-state inflation uncertainty, and the breakdown in the relationship 
between inflation and inflation uncertainty following the introduction of the Euro, 
suggest that in the new economic environment monetary policy might have become 
less effective in lowering inflation uncertainty, possibly as a result of conflicting 
economic and monetary signals, and lack of transparency in the two-pillar strategy 
employed by the ECB. As Bofinger (2002, p.11) argues, “In sum, while the first 
pillar is too narrowly focused on the money stock M3…the second pillar is much too 
broad to provide any guidance for the ECB’s internal decisions or its dialogue with 
public”. Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) also point out that emphasis on using 
movements in the stock of money as a rationale for policy is undesirable since it may 
result in higher inflation and output variability. The fact that lowering inflation 
expectations has become less effective as a way of controlling inflation is yet another 
indication of the difficulties faced by monetary policy in the context of a monetary 
union with widely different member countries. This lack of flexibility, owing to the 
loss of monetary policy independence for individual countries, might account for 
higher inflation persistence. Hence, although it should be kept in mind that the ECB 
is concerned with price stability of the Euro area as a whole, it appears that 
improvements could be made to its analytical framework with a view to lowering the 
estimated long-run uncertainty in individual member countries - for instance, a more 
explicit focus on the inflation forecast might be useful in this respect. 
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 TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
 
Table 1: Unit Root Tests, 1972-2004 
 
 
ADF test statistic 
 
KPSS test statistic 
 
 
Countries Constant Constant and Trend Constant 
Constant and 
Trend 
Germany -2.319 -2.605 2.235 *** 0.244 *** 
Italy -1.144 -3.375 * 1.999 *** 0.273 *** 
France -1.461 -2.896 1.646 *** 0.385 *** 
Spain -1.006 -2.751 3.222 *** 0.451 *** 
Portugal -1.579 -3.568 ** 2.634 *** 0.277 *** 
Greece -2.006 -2.704 1.845 *** 0.34 *** 
Ireland -1.595 -2.539 2.232 *** 0.262 *** 
Finland -1.181 -3.132 2.037 *** 0.222 *** 
Belgium -1.929 -2.765 2.121 *** 0.265 *** 
Netherlands -1.787 -1.965 2.578 *** 0.864 *** 
Luxembourg -2.438 -2.523 3.195 *** 0.304 *** 
Austria  -2.369 -2.684 3.282 *** 0.301 *** 
 
Note: 
 
(a) The number of lagged difference terms in the regressions was chosen by the modified Akaike  
criterion in the ADF regressions. The Andrews bandwidth was used in the KPSS regressions. 
(b) The reported ADF statistics test the null hypothesis that inflation contains a unit root. The reported 
  KPSS statistics test the null hypothesis that inflation is stationary. 
  (c)   ***, **, * indicate rejection of the null hypothesis at 1, 5, 10 % level of significance. 
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Table 2: Robust estimates of Eq. (11), 1980-2004 
 
Germany     France Italy Spain 
2 *
1( )t tσ π +  tH  2 * 1( )t tσ π +  tH  2 * 1( )t tσ π +  tH  2 * 1( )t tσ π +  tH  
0γ  -0.001         0.0002 -0.0004 0.008 0.002 -0.003 0.004 * -0.001
1γ  0.002         -0.00006 0.001 -0.020 0.031 * 0.003 0.130 0.003
2γ  0.009 0.1 *** 0.049 ** 0.329 * 0.099 * -0.039 -0.004 0.029 
3γ  -0.015 * -0.106 ** -0.045 ** 0.047 -0.235 ** 0.041 -1.187 *** -0.037 
2R  0.044        0.225 0.215 0.084 0.165 0.052 0.22 0.032
θσ  0.013        0.05 0.021 0.317 0.078 0.049 0.674 0.076
Wald F-stat 
γ 2+ γ3 = 0 
- 0.053 10.352 *** - 3.306 * - - - 
 
 
Portugal    Greece Ireland Finland 
2 *
1( )t tσ π +  tH  2 * 1( )t tσ π +  tH  2 * 1( )t tσ π +  tH  2 * 1( )t tσ π +  tH  
0γ  0.0001        -0.007 0.001 -0.009 -0.0001 -0.005 -0.0003 -0.002
1γ  0.002        0.004 -0.001 0.009 0.0001 0.008 0.0001 0.004
2γ  0.023 *** 0.052 * -0.0004 0.038 * -0.00002 0.109 ** 0.0025 0.001 
3γ  0.005 -0.028 -0.005 *** -0.036 * 0.0007 *** -0.107 ** 0.0012 -0.011 
2R  0.177        0.054 0.076 0.092 0.101 0.115 0.028 0.019
θσ  0.042        0.169 0.007 0.106 0.002 0.338 0.007 0.026
Wald F-stat 
γ 2+ γ3 = 0 
-        - - 0.049 - 0.02 - -
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Belgium  Netherlands Luxembourg Austria   
2 *
1( )t tσ π +  tH  2 * 1( )t tσ π +  tH  2 * 1( )t tσ π +  tH  2 * 1( )t tσ π +  tH  
0γ  -0.0003        -0.0004 0.0005 -0.00001 0.00007 -0.002 0.0005 0.0002
1γ  0.001         0.001 0.0002 0.0002 0.002 0.002 0.002 ** 0.0001
2γ  0.013 *** -0.011 -0.024 -0.03 0.025 * 0.001 0.004 *** 0.002 
3γ  -0.01 *** 0.008 0.020 0.066 -0.026 * -0.002 -0.004 ** -0.0002 
2R  0.136        0.03 0.033 0.071 0.033 0.001 0.133 0.005
θσ  0.01        0.02 0.041 0.045 0.048 0.037 0.004 0.014
Wald F-stat 
γ 2+ γ3 = 0 
34.313 *** - - - 0.188 - 0.002 - 
 
Note:   σθ represents the standard deviation of the regression’s residuals. 
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Figure 1: Actual inflation and steady-state inflation, 1980-2004.  
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Figure 2: Short-run and steady-state inflation uncertainty, 1980-2004.  
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Figure 3: Inflation persistence and trend inflation, 1980-2004.  
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